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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gary Mallory appeals, contending that the district court made several errors in its 
decisions on his petition for post conviction relief. First, he contends that the district 
court erred when, after an evidentiary hearing, it denied his claim for relief based on trial 
counsel's failure to timely and effectively argue a motion to suppress his statements 
made during an interrogation after he requested the assistance of counsel. The district 
court decided trial counsel acted reasonably even though trial counsel did not file the 
motion timely or ensure that the district court viewed the video of the interrogation, 
which showed that the officers continued to question Mr. Mallory after he invoked his 
right to counsel several times during the course of the interrogation. 
Second, Mr. Mallory contends the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed his claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the district court's 
failure to timely rule on his motion to appoint a private investigator. Specifically, he 
contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing this claim on a basis for 
which Mr. Mallory did not have notice. Additionally, there was, at least, a genuine issue 
of material fact on this claim based on Mr. Mallory's assertions that his rights to due 
process and equal protection were violated because the private investigator was a 
necessary service to gather the information to establish an adequate defense. 
Third, he contends that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "fully litigate" a challenge to the 
evidence and testimony about the nature of the scratches on his body. Specifically, he 
contends that there was evidence indicating that Mr. Mallory had not received the 
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scratches until after the alleged victim had died, and so, trial counsel should have 
challenged the evidence and testimony that the scratch marks were consistent with 
wounds that would have been received in a struggle with the alleged victim. 
Because of these errors, this Court should reverse the orders denying and 
dismissing Mr. Mallory's claims for post conviction relief and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings, 
Mr. Mallory filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief from his conviction for 
first degree murder, which presented claims against trial counsel, appellate counsel, 
prosecutor, and the district court. (R., pp.13-40.) Several of those claims addressed his 
inability to adequately present an alternate perpetrator defense due, in part, to the fact 
that one of the critical witnesses had left the State and could not be located in time for 
trial. (See, e.g., R., pp.19, 23, 37-38.) 
However, relevant to this appeal, he argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 
not timely and effectively arguing to suppress the statements he made during an 
interrogation after he had made several clear requests for counsel (the "Fifth 
Amendment" claim) (R., pp.23-24), that the district court violated his constitutional right 
to due process by not timely ruling on his motion for appointment of a private 
investigator (the "private investigator" claim) (R., pp.33-34), and that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not "fully litigating" an issue surrounding the evidence that the scratch 
marks on his body were caused by the victim, when there was evidence indicating that 
Mr. Mallory had not received those scratches until after the victim had died (the "scratch 
mark" claim) (R., pp.29-30). 
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He attached numerous documents to his petition to support his claims. 
(R., pp.40-72.) For example, in regard to the private investigator claim, tie attached a 
copy of the Motion to Authorize Retention of Private Investigator and (Trial Counsel's] 
Affidavit in Support of Motion. (R., pp.61-62.) Similarly, in regard to the Fifth 
Amendment claim, he attached a letter from appellate counsel which explained why that 
issue, among others, had not been raised on direct appeal. (R., pp.58-59.) 
Specifically on the Fifth Amendment claim, appellate counsel noted that 
Mr. Mallory had requested his attorney numerous times in the recorded interview. 
(R., p.58.) However, appellate counsel explained that he could not pursue the claim on 
direct appeal because "the court found [the motion to suppress that evidence] was 
untimely (it was) and did not find good cause for the late filing. Without a finding of 
good cause to excuse the late filing, thut issue would not prevail on appeal." (R., p.58.) 
Appellate counsel also explained that trial counsel "did not introduce the video of the 
interrogation at the time of the motion. So, the Court ruled on the motion without being 
able to review the video." (R., p.58.) However, appellate counsel informed Mr. Mallory 
that, while the issue could not be adequately raised on direct appeal, it was "another 
potentially strong issue in post-conviction." (R., p.58.) 
The district court appointed post conviction counsel for Mr. Mallory. (R., p.76.) 
Thereafter, the State filed a motion for summary dismissal. (R., p.91.) In regard to the 
private investigator claim and the scratch mark claim, the State argued: "While 
Petitioner presents many hypothetical outcomes, he fails to provide any factual 
evidence to support these claims. Further, Petitioner fails to address why this evidence 
is not included." (R., p.107.) As to the Fifth Amendment claim, the State argued that 
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the motions in question "are neither attached, nor are transcript portions provided to 
establish the existence of oral motions." (R., p.109.) Thus, the State argued that 
Mr. Mallory had failed to adequately support his claims, and so, his petition should be 
summarily dismissed. 
Thereafter, Mr. Mallory filed an amended petition, in which he clarified his claims. 
(R., pp.111-19.) Again, he submitted documents to support his various allegations, 
including, for example, the Motion to Authorize Retention of Private Investigator and 
[Trial Counsel's] Affidavit in Support of Motion. (R., pp.121-56; R., pp.147A8 (the 
motion for appointment of a private investigator).) Mr. Mallory also filed his own 
affidavit, alleging various facts in support of his cloims. (R., pp:157-6·1.) For example, 
in regard to the scratch mark claim, he alleged, "[d]uring preparation for the defense of 
my case, I reviewed the recorded video of the police interrogating me. I pointed out to 
trial co-counsel ... that the scratch marks that the prosecution alleged occurred during 
the commission of the alleged crime were not present at earlier points in the video and 
that those marks were the result of a struggle with the police .... " (R., p.160.) 
The district court determined that Mr. Mallory had failed to present sufficient 
evidence to support most of his claims, including the scratch mark claim, and so, 
summarily dismissed a majority of the claims in the petition. (See R., pp.178-84.) 
Specifically, in regard to the scratch mark claim, the district court concluded that "the 
Petitioner fails to provide evidence from the record that supports his claim that the State 
asserted these scratch marks were received as a result of a struggle with the victim in 
this case. Further, the Petitioner fails to set forth facts which would establish that but for 
this evidence, the outcome of the case would have been different." (R., p.183.) 
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The district court also summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claims that the district 
court had violated his constitutional rights, which included the Fifth Amendment claim, 
"because the Petitioner failed to raise these claims on direct appeal." (R., p.185.) 
However, Mr. Mallory had also alleged that appellate counsel had been ineffective for 
not raising the Fifth Amendment claim. (R., pp.112-·13.) The district court determined 
that appellate counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to raise that issue because it 
had not been adequately argued or preserved by trial counsel. (R., pp:17 4-77.) As 
such, in regard to the Fifth Amendment claim, the district court determined the claim 
would be "best addressed as a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because 
the matter was presented to the trial court in an untimely manner and the trial court did 
not find good cause to excuse the late filing." (R., p.177.) As a result, it ordered an 
evidentiary hearing be held on the Fifth Amendment claim, as well as four other claims 
on which Mr. Mallory had shown a genuine issue of material fact. (R., p:185.) 
Mr. Mallory was the only witness to testify at the evidentiary hearing. 1 He offered 
additional information about the surviving claims, as well as some of the summarily 
dismissed claims (including the scratch mark claim). (See generally Tr.) Following that 
hearing, the district court took judicial notice of the underlying criminal case. 2 (R., p.197 
n.1.) 
1 In the interim between the summary disposition and the evidentiary hearing, the 
district court judge who was handling the case retired, and the case was reassigned to a 
new district court judge. (R., p.191.) 
2 As that underlying case was challenged on appeal, a motion for this Court to take 
judicial notice of the appellate record in Docket No. 37774 has been filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. Citations to that record will be identified as "Supp. 
R." and citations to the transcripts from that record will be identified as "Supp. Tr." 
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The underlying record provided additional evidence in regard to Mr. Mallory's 
claims. For example, in regard to the scratch mark claim, the transcript of the jury 
trial reveals that Officer Zachary Ward testified about seeing the scratch marks on 
Mr. Mallory and gave his opinion to the jury that those scratch marks were consistent 
with wounds caused by a victim trying to escape an attacker. (Supp. Tr., p.631, 
L.23 - p.632, L.20.) The prosecutor also argued that fact to the jury during closing 
argument. (Supp. Tr., p.1277, Ls.16-22.) 
On the Fifth Amendment claim, the underlying record revealed that Mr. Mallory's 
trial attorney filed a motion to suppress the statements in the video of the interrogation 
four days before the trial was scheduled to start. (Supp. R. pp.156, 254.) The district 
court noted the lateness of the motion was one reason for denying the motion. 
(See Supp. Tr., p.80, L.25 - p.81, L.1.) Trial counsel conceded the motion was filed 
late, but argued there was good cause for the late filing, arguing that he had just learned 
that there was a 19-second portion of the recording that was missing and argued that 
Mr. Mallory requested an attorney during that gap. (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.2-18.) 
The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress the interrogation reveals 
that trial counsel did not challenge the prosecutor's assertion that Mr. Mallory first 
requested an attorney at time stamp 1 :34:32 of the interrogation.3 (See generally 
Supp. Tr., pp.80-122 (transcript of the entire hearing on the motion to suppress); 
3 The video time stamp starts at 12:36:45 p.m. and runs through 3:28:44 p.m. and will 
be identified by its trial exhibit number: State's Exhibit 15. Where specific portions of 
the video are referenced, the corresponding time stamp is given to the best of appellate 
post conviction counsel's ability. Where quotations from the video of the interrogation 
are necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate post conviction counsel's 
ability, as there is no transcript of that video. (See generally Supp. R.) 
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compare R., p.58 (letter from appellate counsel noting that the video shows Mr. Mallory 
requesting an attorney at ·1:15:30, 1:17:50, 1:19:00, 1:22:50, and 1:31:30). That State 
presented the testimony of Officer Brian Birdseil, who testified that Mr. Mallory did not 
request counsel during the 19-second gap. (Supp. Tr., p.97, Ls.12-·19.) The video of 
the interrogation was also introduced as an exhibit by the State (Supp. Tr., p.104, 
Ls.14-25), although there is no indication the video was played for the court during the 
hearing. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.80-122.) 
However, the video does depict almost all of the interrogation of Mr. Mallory.4 
For the first several minutes after the officers entered the room to begin questioning 
Mr. Mallory (State's Exhibit ·1 s, ·12:57: 15), Mr. Mallory did not respond to any of their 
attempts to get him to talk. (State's Exhibit ·J 5, 12:57:15-12:59:53) After a while, 
Mr. Mallory got on his knees with his hands behind his back. (State's Exhibit 15, 
12:59:53.) When asked what he was doing, Mr. Mallory made no audible response, and 
the officers told him that, if he wanted them to handcuff him, he would need to stand up; 
Mr. Mallory complied with that instruction. (State's Exhibit 15, 12:59:53-1 :00:33.) 
After being handcuffed, Mr. Mallory leaned against the wall saying nothing for 
several minutes while officers tried to get him to talk. (State's Exhibit 15, 
1 :00:33-1 :04:23.) When he finally did respond, he simply said, "I heard the offer to just 
go to jail, so I'll just go to jail. I'm done with it." (State's Exhibit 1 :04:23.) Not long 
thereafter, Mr. Mallory became upset with one of the officers and ended up in a physical 
confrontation with several officers. (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :04:30-1 :05:50.) Mr. Mallory 
4 There are several spots besides the 19-second gap identified by trial counsel where 
the recording skips forward, causing small gaps in the recording. However, none of 
those skips appear to impact the arguments in this post conviction appeal. 
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eventually calmed down, but continued to tell the officers that he had nothing to say or 
they should just take him to jail. (See State's Exhibit 15, 1:06:29-·1:12:·10.) He 
explained that "it was an offer, either cooperate or go to jail. I'm ready to go to jail." 
(State's Exhibit 15, 1 :13:03) Ultimately, though, he made some statements relevant to 
the investigation, describing what he had been doing that morning. (State's Exhibit ·15, 
1: ·13:36.) However, after making those statements, he said, "I already said all I gotta to 
say, just take me to jail." (State's Exhibit 15, 1:14:32.) 
Then, Mr. Mallory told officers, "Get a lawyer, call my mom and dad, [expletive 
deleted] that drink of water, put me in jail. That's it." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :15:30.) The 
officer did not respond directly to that statement, instead asking, "What happened last 
night? What happened last night between you and your wife? That's what I'm 
concerned about. That's the issue we need to talk about." (State's Exhibit 15, 1: 15:4 ·1.) 
A few minutes later, Mr. Mallory said again, "I just need to go to jail. I don't have 
an attorney. I haven't called my mom and dad. [expletive deleted] the water. Let's just 
go to jail." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :17:49.) The questioning officer responded, "Okay, well, 
we're kinda talking right now." (State's Exhibit 15, 1: 17:55.) Mr. Mallory told him, 
"It ain't happening. Like I said, I ain't brand new." (State's Exhibit 15, 1:17:59.) The 
questioning officer responded, "Well, I know you're not brand new. Neither am I. That's 
why we need to sit here and talk." (State's Exhibit 15, 1: 18:06.) 
Mr. Mallory talked for another few minutes, before saying, "I already told you that. 
And, without a lawyer ... Like I said, I've been a pro for jail. Without a lawyer .... ," at 
which point, he trailed off while shaking his head from side to side. (State's Exhibit 15, 
1 :18:59.) Approximately thirty seconds later, he added, "So why can't you guys be true 
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to your word? Put me in a small cell, send me to State Hospital North. It's past 
history .... So if we're all done with this silly [expletive deleted)?" (State's Exhibit 15, 
1:19:24-1:19:45.) 
The officers continued to question Mr. Mallory, and a few minutes later, 
Mr. Mallory told them, "Well, then, call my attorney." (State's Exhibit ·15, 1 :22:47.) They 
asked him, "Who's your attorney?" (State's Exhibit ·15, 1 :22:49.) Mr. Mallory told them 
'Van ldour."5 (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :22:52.) At that point, the questioning officers left the 
room and were replaced by another officer. Not long thereafter, Mr. Mallory moved to 
get up from where he had been sitting on the floor, and when the new officer asked if he 
could help, Mr. Mallory responded, "[expletive deleted]. Other than my lawyer." (State's 
Exhibit 15, 1 :24:23.) Mr. Mallory then positioned himself in another corner of the room 
with a chair between him and the officer (officers quickly removed the chair from the 
room). (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :24:39.) 
A few minutes later, the officer who had been questioning Mr. Mallory reinitiated 
contact with Mr. Mallory, asking him "What we'd like to do, if you consent, is uh, maybe 
scrape your fingernails, swab your hands, take some physical evidence from your 
person." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :26:55.) Mr. Mallory agreed, but after that, made several 
statements relevant to the investigation. (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :26:55-1 :31 :40.) 
After making those statements, Mr. Mallory said, "Just like I said, the offer. 
Otherwise, I mean to tell you, lock me up, call my lawyer." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :31 :49.) 
A minute later, he added, "It's actually Joanne McFarland through Van ldour." (State's 
5 Robert Van ldour was initially appointed to represent Mr. Mallory in this case. (See, 
e.g., Supp. R., pp.20-22.) 
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Exhibit 15, 1 :32:47.) Another of the officers who had initially tried to question 
Mr. Mallory came back into the room with what appeared to be an evidence collection 
kit, and he asked Mr. Mallory, "So Gary, you said you'd be okay doing this so you can 
get out of here, right?" (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :33:35.) Mr. Mallory replied, ''Yes, but I still 
see nobody's made a phone call. I want to talk with you and what am I getting here? 
Where's McFarland?" (State's Exhibit 1 :34:13.) Officers asked if that was his attorney, 
and about twenty seconds later, Mr. Mallory said, "Before we carry on with this, I'd like 
my lawyer present." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :34:28.) That final statement is the one the 
prosecutor identified as the request for counsel, and she noted that, after that 
statement, the questioning ceased. (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.17-24.) 
Although that video was not played during the hearing on Mr. Mallory's motion to 
suppress, the district court orally ruled on Mr. Mallory's motion at the end of the hearing. 
(Supp. Tr., p."121, Ls.8-20.) It determined Officer Birdsell's testimony was credible and 
that Mr. Mallory had not presented sufficient facts to prove his motion. (Supp. 
Tr., p.121, Ls.8-18.) As such, it denied the motion. (Supp. Tr., p.121, Ls.18-20.) 
The district court reviewed each of Mr. Mallory's surviving post conviction claims 
and denied relief on each claim in turn. 6 In regard to the Fifth Amendment claim, the 
only reason the district court gave for denying that claim was that "[t]he transcript and 
6 The post conviction court's decision speaks in terms of "granting the motion to 
summarily dismiss" the claims that had proceeded to the evidentiary hearing. 
(See, e.g., R., p.203.) Appellate post conviction counsel is unable to determine whether 
this is a typographical error or whether the district court was affirmatively applying the 
wrong standard of review. However, as the standard of proof at an evidentiary hearing 
is higher than the standard to survive summary judgment, the relevant arguments in this 
appeal will focus on the evidentiary hearing standard. 
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motions filed in CR-2009-0172[7] establish that trial counsel was acting within the 
bounds of objective reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms." 
(R., pp.203-04.) Ultimately, the district court entered a final judgment which dismissed 
all the claims in the petition. (R., p.208.) Mr. Mallory filed a timely notice of appeal from 
the final judgment. (R., pp.210-12.) 
7 This appears to be a misstatement caused by a typographical error on some 
documents in the underlying record. (Compare Supp. R., p.330 (Judgment of 
Conviction captioning the case as "CR 2009-0172"); with Supp. R., p.271 (verdict form 
captioning the case as "CR 2009-1472").) The online repository confirms that the 
underlying case is CR 2009-14 72, and identifies CR 2009-0172 as an unrelated 
infraction case, State v. Miley. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred, following an evidentiary hearing, when it denied 
Mr. Mallory's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and 
effectively argue the motion to suppress the video of t1is interrogation. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim 
that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated 
when the district court failed to timely rule on his motion to appoint a private 
investigator. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "fully litigate" a challenge to 
evidence and testimony regarding the nature of the scratch marks on his person. 
12 
ARGUMENT. 
L 
The District Court Erred, Followin I An Evidentia y Hearing, When It Denied 
Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Timely And 
Effectively Argue The Motion To Suppress The Video Of His lnterro 1ation 
In regard to his Fifth Amendment claim, Mr. Mallory asserts that the video of the 
interrogation shows he unambiguously requested an attorney eight times before the 
police finally honored his request and ended the interrogation. (R., pp.115-16.) 
However, the video of that interrogation 1,vas played for the jury at his trial in the 
underlying criminal case, and the prosecutor argued that the statements Mr. Mc.lllory 
made after requesting an attorney were inconsistent with other statements he had 
made during the police investigation. (Supp. Tr., p. 732, Ls.23-24; Supp. Tr., p:1300, 
L.21 - p:130·1, L.14.) As such, Mr. Mallory contended in post conviction that his trial 
attorney was ineffective for not timely and effectively arguing a motion to suppress that 
video, and counsel's unreasonable failure to do so prejudiced him. 
In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the 
petitioner must show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 687 
(1984). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner needs to show that "counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. To 
establish prejudice, the petitioner needs to show that "there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. 
13 
When reviewing the decision to deny post conviction relief after an evidentiary 
hearing, "an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous. We exercise free review of the district court's application of the 
relevant law to the facts.'' Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(internal citations omitted). At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner is required to prove 
his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
The district court denied Mr. Mallory's claim regarding trial counsel's failure to 
timely and effectively argue the motion to suppress the video of the interrogation based 
on its determination that trial counsel had effectively argued the motion to the trial court. 
(R., pp.203-04.) Insofar as that is a finding of fact, it is disproved by the record and 
should be set aside as clearly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 
659 (2007) (a factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence). If it is a legal conclusion, it is erroneous because an attorney 
does not perform in an objectively reasonable manner by filing late motions and by not 
challenging factual assertions by opposing counsel, especially when the attorney has 
evidence, such as a video of the event in question, that directly contradicts opposing 
counsel's assertion. 
Specifically, the district court's determined that "[t]he transcript and motions filed 
in CR-2009-0172 establish that trial counsel was acting within the bounds of objective 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (R., p.203.) That determination 
is wrong for two reasons: (1) it does not address the fact that trial counsel filed the 
motion late and did not have good cause for the late filing; (2) it does not address the 
fact that trial counsel did not ensure the court actually viewed the video prior to making 
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its ruling. Both of these reasons are sufficient to show unreasonable and deficient 
performance by trial counsel in presenting the motion to suppress, and together, 
establish deficient performance by a preponderance of the evidence. 
A. Mr. Mallo Proved Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Based On The Fact That 
Trial Counsel Did Not Timel i File The Motion To Suppress 
Idaho Criminal Rule ·12(d) requires that a pretrial motion filed pursuant to 
I.C.R. 12(b), which includes motions to suppress (1.C.R. 12(b)(3)), must be filed at least 
seven days before trial. The motion to suppress the video interrogation was filed only 
four days before the jury trial was scheduled to begin. (Supp. R., pp:156, 254.) As 
such, trial counsel conceded that the motion was not timely. (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.17-·18.) 
The district court denied the motion to suppress based, at least in part, on the fact that 
the motion was not timely: "it's obviously not timely, not close to being timely." 
(Supp. Tr., p.80, L.25 - p.81, L.1; see also R., p.177 (the post conviction district court 
noting at the summary dismissal stage that this claim is "best addressed as a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because the matter was presented to the trial 
court in an untimely manner and the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the 
late filing.") Failure to file a timely motion constitutes deficient performance when the 
petitioner can show that the motion would have been granted. 
Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 358 (Ct. App. 1998). 
See, e.g., 
In Hernandez, the Court of Appeals also addressed the prejudicial impact of that 
sort of deficient performance: 
Because Hernandez's arrest was unlawful and the .068 grams of 
methamphetamine found incident thereto should have been suppressed 
had a timely motion to suppress been filed by defense counsel, we find 
that Hernandez has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by defense 
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counsel's judicially determined ineffective assistance. Accordingly, we 
reverse the decision and order of the district court dismissing Hernandez's 
petition for post conviction relief. 
Id. Like in Hernandez, Mr. Mallory was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a 
timely motion to suppress the interrogation. That prejudice is demonstrated by the fact 
that the motion to suppress the video of the interrogation was a meritorious motion and 
would have resulted in the suppression of that video had the motion been timely filed. 
In addition, the statements recorded in the video were used to discredit the defense's 
theory at trial. 
When reviewing a claim that a person has requested an attorney during an 
interrogation, the standard is objective: "Although r1 suspect need not 'speak with the 
discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must articulate his desire to have counsel present 
sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request for an attorney." State v. Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 537 (Ct. App. 
2001) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994 )). Therefore, all that is 
required of the suspect is that he make '"some statement that can reasonably be 
construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney."' 
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991 )) 
(emphasis added). Once a suspect invokes his right to an attorney, he may not be 
"subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect 
himself reinitiates conversation." Davis 512 U.S. at 458 (explaining the rule from 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981 )). 
The video of the interrogation shows that Mr. Mallory made eight statements that 
were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would understand 
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that statement to be an expression of the desire for the assistance of an attorney. 
However, officers reinitiated questioning of Mr. Mallory after most of those statements, 
and so, all of Mr. Mallory's comments after those requests would have been suppressed 
pursuant to a timely motion to suppress. 
For example, at time stamp 1 :15:30, Mr. Mallory told officers, "Get a lawyer, call 
my morn and dad, [expletive deleted] that drink of water, put me in jail. That's it." 
(State's Exhibit 15, 1 :15:30.) This was not an equivocal statement or question about the 
right to an attorney. Compare, e.g., State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 889 (Ct. App. 
1983) (holding that the defendant's statements, "Maybe I need an attorney," or "I think 
I need an attorney," were not sufficient to trigger the constitutional right to counsel) 
(overruled on other grounds as explained in Eby, 136 Idaho at 537). Rather, 
Mr. Mallory made a straightforward assertion: "Get a lawyer . ... That's it." (State's 
Exhibit 15, 1: 15:30 ( emphasis added).) A reasonable officer would understand that 
command to be a request for an attorney. 
Nevertheless, the questioning officer immediately continued the interrogation, 
asking, "What happened last night? What happened last night between you and your 
wife? That's what I'm concerned about. That's the issue we need to talk about." 
(State's Exhibit 15, 1 :15:41.) Since the officers reinitiated contact after Mr. Mallory's 
request for a lawyer, any statements Mr. Mallory made after that request would have 
been suppressed pursuant to a timely motion. 
Furthermore, even if the command to "[g]et a lawyer" was not sufficiently clear by 
itself, the surrounding circumstances left little room for doubt over the meaning of 
Mr. Mallory's statement. For the first several minutes after the officers entered the room 
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to begin questioning Mr. Mallory (time stamp 12:57: ·15), Mr. Mallory did not respond to 
any of their attempts to get t1irn to talk. (State's Exhibit 15, 12:57:15-12:59:53) When 
he finally did respond, it was only to get on his knees with his hands behind his back. 
(State's Exhibit 15, 12:59:53.) Once he was handcuffed, Mr. Mallory leaned against the 
wall saying nothing for several minutes despite the officers continued requests for him 
to talk. (State's Exhibit 15, 1:00:33-1:04:23.) When he finally did respond, it is to say "I 
heard the offer to just go to jail, so I'll just go to jail. I'm done with it." (State's Exhibit 
1 :04:23 (emphasis added).) Thus, all of Mr. Mallory's actions indicate that he did not 
want to talk, he just wanted to go to jail. 
Mr. Mallory continued repeat his mantra about the offer to coopernte or go to jail, 
telling officers he preferred the latter option, as he had nothing to say. ( See, e.g., 
State's Exhibit 15, 1 :06:29, ·J :06:55, 1 :08:06, 1 :09:15, 1 :09:32, 1 :09:55, "1:11 :51, 
1: 12: 1 O; 1: 13:03) Nevertheless, he finally did make some statements relevant to the 
investigation, specifically, describing what he had been doing that morning. (State's 
Exhibit 15, 1 :13:36.) However, after making those statements, he said, "I already said 
all I gotta to say, just take me to jail." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :14:32.) He followed that 
statement with the command to "[g]et a lawyer ... put me in jail. That's it." (State's 
Exhibit 15, 1 :15:30.) Given all the circumstances of this interview, Mr. Mallory's 
assertion to "[g]et a lawyer .... put me in jail. That's it," can only reasonably be 
understood to be an expression of his desire to not speak to officers any more without 
first talking to a lawyer. It is definitely a statement that can reasonably be construed to 
be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney, and therefore, triggers 
the constitutional right to counsel. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. 
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As such, all the statements Mr. Mallory made once the officers reinitiated contact with 
him would have been suppressed pursuant to a timely motion to suppress. 
However, Mr. Mallory reiterated his request for an attorney as the interrogation 
continued: "I just need to go to jail. I don't have an attorney. I haven't ca!led my mom 
and dad. [expletive deleted] the water. Let's just go to jail." (State's Exhibit 15, 
1: 17:49.) Particularly given his earlier command to "[g]et a lawyer," a reasonable officer 
would understand this statement to be a renewal of that request I do not have my 
attorney yet, so just take me to jail. Again, it is, at least, a statement that can 
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an 
attorney, and therefore, triggers the constitutional right to counsel. 
In fact, the record indicates that the officers actually understood the meaning of 
this statement. In response to this second request for an attorney, the questioning 
officer said, "Okay, well, we're kinda talking right now." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :17:55.) 
Mr. Mallory retorted, "It ain't happening. Like I said, I ain't brand new." (State's Exhibit 
15, 1:17:59.) The officer responded, "Well, I know you're not brand new. Neither am I. 
That's why we need to sit here and talk." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :18:06.) The officer's 
statements demonstrate that, given the context of this interrogation, he understood 
Mr. Mallory's meaning - "I don't have an attorney," but I am not new to this, I know my 
rights, I want an attorney." And yet, despite understanding Mr. Mallory's statement, the 
officer did not scrupulously honor Mr. Mallory's request for counsel. Instead, he 
continued to question Mr. Mallory. Compare State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 941-42 
(Ct. App. 2004) (holding that, when the officer did not scrupulously honor the 
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defendant's request for counsel, "[aJII of Person's statements mado after his invocation 
of the right to counsel ... should therefore have been suppressed.") 
Mr. Mallory renewed his request for counsel again a few minutes later, shaking 
his head from side to side and saying "I already told you that. And, without a lawyer ... 
Like I said, I've been a pro for jail. Without a lawyer .... " (State's Exhibit ·1 s, 1 :18:59.) 
Mr. Mallory followed up that comment by reiterating his mantra from earlier in the 
interrogation: "So why can't you guys be true to your word? Put me in a small cell, 
send me to State Hospital North. It's past history." (State's Exhibit 15, ·J: 19:24.) After a 
few more minutes, he again indicated his desire for the interview to end: "So if we're all 
done with this silly [ expletive deleted]?" (State's Exhibit 15, 1: 19:45.) 
By trailing off after telling the officers "Without a lawyer," while shaking his head 
in a gesture commonly understood to mean "no," and in light of his follow up 
statements, Mr. Mallory's meaning was clear I want this interview, this "silly [expletive 
deleted]" to end because I am "without a lawyer." Since that is a statement that can 
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an 
attorney (particularly given the previous statements to this effect and Mr. Mallory's 
overall behavior during the interrogation), it triggers the constitutional right to counsel. 
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. 
However, the officers continued to question Mr. Mallory after that request for 
counsel. After a few minutes of that, Mr. Mallory requested an attorney for a fourth time. 
This time, he told the officers, "Well, then, call my attorney." (State's Exhibit 15, 
1 :22:47.) They asked him "Who's your attorney?" (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :22:49.) 
Mr. Mallory told them "Van !dour." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :22:52.) This time, he has not 
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requested just any attorney, he requested that they call a particular attorney - Robert 
Van !dour. Since the officers directly asked who Mr. Mallory's attorney was, there is no 
question that they understood the meaning of his command to "call my attorney." Thus, 
this was an unequivocal request for the assistance of counsel. 
It is noteworthy that the questioning officers did temporarily stop interrogating 
Mr. Mallory after his fourth request for counsel. They left the room and were replaced 
by another officer. At that time, Mr. Mallory moved to get up from the floor, and when 
the new officer asked if he could help, Mr. Mallory responded, "[expletive deleted]. 
Other than my lawyer." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :24:23.) He then positioned himself in the 
corner of the room with a chair between hirn and the officer. (State's Exhibit 15, 
1 :24:39.) The indication from his statement, his actions, and the surrounding 
circumstances (namely, the new officer's offer of assistance) is that Mr. Mailory did not 
want anything from the officers except his lawyer. As such, this constitutes another 
clear expression that he wanted to talk to his attorney and did not want to deal with the 
officers until that happened. Therefore, that statement to the new officer was his fifth 
request for an attorney. 
And yet, a few minutes later, the officer who had been questioning Mr. Mallory 
before returned and reinitiated contact with Mr. Mallory, asking Mr. Mallory for consent 
to search his person: "What we'd like to do, if you consent, is uh, maybe scrape your 
fingernails, swab your hands, take some physical evidence from your person." (State's 
Exhibit 15, 1 :26:55.) After the officer reinitiated contact with Mr. Mallory, Mr. Mallory 
made several statements about what had happened the night before. (State's Exhibit 
15, 1 :26:55-1 :31 :40.) Thus, all the statements Mr. Mallory made after the officers 
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reinitiated contact with him at that point would have been suppressed pursuant to a 
timely motion to suppress. 
Mr. Mallory made his sixth request for an attorney a few minutes after that, 
repeating l1is mantra again: "Just like I said, the offer. Otherwise, I mean to tell you, 
lock me up, call my lawyer." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :31 :49.) A minute later, he clarified 
his request, stating that his attorney was ''actually Joanne McFarland through Van 
ldour." (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :32:47.) Again, he was requesting that the officers call a 
particular attorney, and, until they did so, end the interview and lock him up. Yet again, 
this constitutes a statement that is clear and unambiguous in its expression of his desire 
for the assistance of an attorney (particularly given the previous statements to this 
effect). 
Nevertheless, one of the officers came back into the room with what appeared to 
be an evidence collection kit and reinitiated contact with Mr. Mallory, asking, "So Gary, 
you said you'd be okay doing this so you can get out of here, right?" (State's Exhibit 15, 
1 :33:35.) Mr. Mallory replied, "Yes, but I still see nobody's made a phone call. I want to 
talk with you and what am I getting here? Where's McFarland?" (State's Exhibit 
1 :34:13.) It is noteworthy (but ultimately, irrelevant to the conclusion, as Mr. Mallory's 
previous statements triggered the right to counsel) that Mr. Mallory rephrased his 
request, noting that he did want to talk with police, but clearly indicating that he did not 
want to do so without his attorney present: "I want to talk to you . . . Where's 
McFarland?" (State's Exhibit 15, 1 :34: 13.) 
Thirty seconds later, Mr. Mallory reiterated his request for an attorney for the 
eighth time: "Before we carry on with this, I'd like my lawyer present." (State's Exhibit 
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·15, 1 :34:28.) This time, the officers finally got it and the questioning stopped at that 
point. (See Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.20-23 (the prosecutor conceding this fact).) However, 
there is no appreciable difference between this final request and the seven previous 
requests. There is no requirement that Mr. Mallory speak some magic words, like ''I'd 
like my lawyer present" to invoke his constitutional right. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (a 
suspect need not "speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don"); cf Eby, 136 Idaho 
at 537 (quoting Davis on this point). 
Rather, all eight requests for an attorney were sufficiently clear statements that a 
reasonable officer would understand them to be statements expressing Mr. Mallory's 
desire for the assistance of Dn attorney. That is all that the Constitution requires. Since 
Mr. Mallory made a sufficient request for an attorney as early as time stamp 1: 15:30, a 
timely motion to suppress all his statements thereafter would have been successful, and 
therefore, trial counsei's failure to pursue a timely motion to suppress constitutes 
deficient performance. Compare Hernandez, 132 Idaho at 358. 
Furthermore, that deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Mallory since, had the 
video of the interrogation been suppressed, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury 
verdict would have been different as one of the jurors may have retained a reasonable 
doubt about Mr. Mallory's guilt. After all, the prosecutor argued that the statements from 
the video of the interrogation cast doubt on the veracity of the defense's theory and 
version of events. (Supp. Tr., p.1300, L.21 - p.1301, L.14.) Without that evidence, 
there is a reasonable possibility that at least one of the jurors would have believed the 
defense theory far enough to maintain a reasonable doubt about Mr. Mallory's guilt. 
This is particularly true were, as here, the case is circumstantial and the defense is 
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arguing an alternate perpetrator theory. The evidence trial counsel should have 
challenged is evidence that made it more likely that Mr. Mallory was involved in the 
alleged criminal act. Thus, removing that evidence from the jury's consideration 
certainly "undermine[s] confidence in the [verdict]," and that is all that Mr. Mallory is 
required to show to prove his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694. 
Therefore, Mr. Mallory presented sufficient evidence to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel performed unreasonably by not filing a 
timely motion to suppress the video of the interrogation and that he was prejudiced by 
that unreasonable performance. As a result, this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying Mr. Mallory post conviction relief on this claim. 
B. Mr. Mallory Proved Trial Counsel Was Deficient For Not Ensuring That The 
District Court Viewed The Video 
Trial counsel was also deficient in his representation regarding the motion to 
suppress the video of the interrogation by not ensuring the district court viewed the 
video, rather than leaving it to rely on the representations of counsel, especially since 
the video disproved the prosecutor's representation in that regard. This is true even 
though the video was admitted as an exhibit (at the State's, not defense counsel's, 
motion (Supp. Tr., p.104, Ls.14-25)), because the district court did not take the time to 
view that video. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.80-122 (the entire motion hearing, 
revealing no recess to view the video between counsels' argument and the district 
court's oral ruling on the motion (Supp. Tr., p.120, 17 - p.121, L.20)).) As discussed in 
Section l(A), supra, the video recorded a total of eight requests Mr. Mallory made for his 
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attorney, and was the best evidence of what Mr. Mallory requested. There is no 
strategic reason for trial counsel to have withheld that evidence from the court to only 
argue that Mr. Mallory must have requested an attorney during a 19-second gap in the 
recording. 
Additionaily, the prejudice caused to Mr. Mallory by trial counsel's failure to 
effectively argue the motion or make sure the district court judge viewed the evidence in 
support of the motion is the same as the prejudice caused by his failure to file the 
motion timely. Had trial counsel argued the motion effectively, the statements 
Mr. Mallory made after he requested counsel would have been suppressed, and 
therefore, could not have been used against him at trial. Without that evidence, 
confidence in the verdict is undermined, and therefore, there is a reasonable probability 
that the jury verdict would have been different without the video of the interrogation as 
evidence. 
As such, this Court should reverse the order denying relief on this claim; 
Mr. Mallory proved he was entitled to that relief. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That His 
Constitutional Rights To Due Process And Equal Protection Were Violated When The 
District Court Failed To Timely Rule On His Motion To Appoint A Private Investigator 
In regard to the private investigator claim, Mr. Mallory asserted that the trial court 
had violated his constitutional rights by not timely ruling on his motion for a private 
investigator. (R., p.118.) Specifically, he alleged that "[t]he result of not ruling on the 
motion in a timely manner was potential evidence was lost/changed, potential 
witnesses['] memories of events were lost. Such error prevented petitioner from 
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receiving due process of law and a fair and just result in his C3se." (R, p.118.) The 
district court summarily dismissed that claim because it found the claims should have 
been raised on direct appeal. (R., p.185.) The district court erred for three reasons. 
First, Mr. Mallory never received notice of that basis for summarily dismissal. Second, 
Mr. Mallory presented evidence showing that these claims could not have been raised 
on direct appeal in an exercise of due diligence. Third, Mr. Mallory alleged sufficient 
facts to raise, at least, a genuine issue of material fact on this claim. For any of those 
reasons, this Court stiould reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing this 
claim. 
A. The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim Of 
Constitutional Error Without Providing Him Notice Of The Reason For Summary 
Dismissal 
The reason the district court gave for summarily dismissing Mr. Mallory's claims 
that his constitutional rights had been violated by the district court, which included the 
private investigator claim, was: 
[T]he Petitioner failed to raise the claims on direct appeal. I.C. § 19-
4901 (b) states, in pertinent part, that "any issue which could have been 
raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings." A review of the appellate 
proceedings in this case indicates that these matters were not addressed 
on appeal. Thus, they will not be considered on post-conviction. 
(R., pp.184-85.) Mr. Mallory was not given notice of this potential defect in his 
pleadings, nor was he afforded the opportunity to address that potential defect. Since 
Mr. Mallory was not afforded the notice required by the statutes, the order summarily 
dismissing this claim cannot stand. 
26 
If a court would summarily dismiss a clairn for post conviction relief, the post 
conviction statutes require that the petitioner be provided notice of the bases for 
summary dismissal. I.C. § 19-4906(b); see DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602 
(2009). According to the Idaho Supreme Court, there are two ways in which notice may 
be provided - either through a notice of intent to dismiss on the district court's own 
motion or through a motion for summary dismissal filed by the State: 
The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does not 
give the parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reason for doing so as 
required by Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ). Likewise, if the State moves to 
dismiss a petition under Idaho Code § 19-4906(c), the court cannot 
dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the state in its motion unless 
the court gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b ). 
DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602. 
In this case, the district court did not provide a notice of intent to dismiss the 
claims on its own motion. (See generally R.) Therefore, the only potential source of 
notice for summary dismissal was the State's motion for summary dismissal. ( See 
R., pp.91, 103-09 (the state's motion and brief in support).) In regard to Mr. Mallory's 
claims that the district court violated his constitutional rights, the State's entire argument 
for summary dismissal was as follows: 
Petitioner claims, through a series of alleged occurrences, that 
judicial misconduct occurred throughout his trial. These allegations 
include a variety of motions that allegedly went undecided. These motions 
are neither attached, nor are transcript portions provided to establish the 
existence of oral motions. 
A petitioner's application for relief must be submitted with attached 
affidavits, records, or other evidence to provide factual backing of the 
allegations made. I.C. 19-4903. In lieu of these attachments, I.C. 19-
4903 allows a petitioner to make a statement regarding the documents['] 
absence. Without any facts to establish the handling of these motions, 
and without the motions themselves or a copy of the transcript 
establishing their existence, a factual conclusion cannot be made. Since 
no affidavits, records, or other evidence is attached, and no explanation is 
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given for the lack of this information, Petitioner's application is insufficim1t 
under I.C. 19-4903 and should therefore be dismissed. 
(F~., pp.108-09.) The State did not modify its position in response to Mr. Mallory's 
amended petition for post conviction relief. (See generally R.) As such, the only basis 
for summary dismissal for which Mr. Mallory had any notice was that he had not 
provided sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the motions at issue.8 
Since no notice was ever provided indicating that Mr. Mallory's claims that his 
constitutional rights Wf)re violated could be summarily dismissed on the grounds that 
they should have been raised on direct appeal, the district court's order summarily 
dismissing those claims on that basis without providing the requisite twenty days for 
Mr. Mallory to respond, the order dismissing those claims (in particular, his claim 
regarding his motion for appointment of a private investigator) must be vacated.9 
DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602. 
8 The State is simply wrong in its assertion that Mr. Mallory did not attach the motions at 
issue to his pro se petition; he did. (R., pp.59-64.) Therefore, the basis the State 
argued for summary dismissal was not actually a valid basis for summary dismissal. 
Since that was the only basis for dismissal of which Mr. Mallory had notice, these claims 
should have gone to an evidentiary hearing. 
Even if that was not the case, Mr. Mallory took the opportunity to respond to this 
alleged deficiency in his amended petition for relief. He attached another copy of the 
Motion to Authorize Retention of a Private Investigator and [Trial Counsel's] Affidavit in 
Support of Motion to his amended petition. (R., pp.147-48.) He also clarified the 
allegation of his rights, articulating that it stemmed form the fact that the district court 
had not granted his motion "until six (6) months after petitioner's motion." (R., p.118.) 
Thus, once the amended petition was filed, there definitely were sufficient facts alleged 
in and attached to the amended petition to comport with the requirements of I.C. § 19-
4903. Compare Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934-35 (1990) (finding that the 
petitioner had alleged sufficient facts in his petition which, if presumed to be true, even 
in the face of affidavits contradicting his allegations, would have entitled him to relief, 
and so, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the order summarily dismissing the claim). 
9 Even if the district court was ultimately correct and Mr. Mallory's claims that his 
constitutional rights were violated by the district court's untimely rulings should have 
been raised on direct appeal, the order summarily dismissing Mr. Mallory's petition is 
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B. Mr. Mallo Presented Sufficient Facts To Show That His Claims That The 
District Court Had Violated His Constitutional Ri hts Were Pro erl Raised In 
Post Conviction 
In his amended petition for relief, Mr. Mallory clearly framed his claims regarding 
the failurB of the district court to timely rule on his motions as alleging violations of his 
constitutional rights. (R., pp.118-19.) I.C. § 19-4901 provides that this is a valid post 
conviction claim: "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and 
who claims: That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of 
the United States or the constitution or laws of the State," provided, in part, that "the 
asserted basis for relief could not, in the exercise of c!ue diligence, have been presented 
earlier." LC. § ·19-4901(a)-(b); see also DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04 (vacating the 
order for summary dismissal because "[t]he district court erred in analyzing DeRushe's 
claim as alleging ineffective assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his 
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf"); Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700 
(Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing and explaining the difference between post conviction 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and claims alleging a violation of a 
constitutional right). 
Mr. Mallory presented sufficient evidence to justify validly bringing these claims in 
post conviction by submitting evidence showing that those claims could not, in the 
still inappropriate because, in that scenario, appellate counsel would have been 
ineffective for not raising those claims, particularly the private investigator claim, on 
direct appeal. To that point, Mr. Mallory did claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for "not fully investigating the record and litigating those irregularities that occurred 
before and during the trial in petitioner's criminal case," and thus, alleged error in this 
regard. (R., p.113.) Either way, Mr. Mallory was entitled to, at least, an evidentiary 
hearing regarding his claim that his constitutional right to due process and equal 
protection were violated by the district court's failure to rule timely on his motions 
(particularly his motion for appointment of a private investigator). 
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exercise of due diligence, been raised on direct appeal. Specifically, he presented a 
letter from appellate counsel with his petition for relief which explained why certain 
claims had not been raised on direct appeal. (See, e.g., R., pp.129-30.) One of those 
explanations corresponded specifically to one of Mr. Mallory's post conviction claims of 
constitutional error - that the district court erred in denying his motion for continuance. 10 
(Compare R., pp.129-30 with R., p.119.) Appellate counsel explained that the record on 
direct appeal contained insufficient information upon which to base a valid claim for 
relief in this regard: "your [trial] attorney never made a showing of what the missing 
witness would have testified to or what efforts he had made to try to find the witness. If 
you could prove that he could have found the witness and the witness would have been 
favorable to you, you could raise that on post-conviction." (R., pp.129-30.) This shows 
that in the exercise of due diligence, these claims of error could not have been raised in 
direct appeal. 
Furthermore, the district court had already found that appellate counsel was not 
ineffective for deciding not to raise these claims as they were not adequately preserved 
below. (R., pp.174-77 (citing Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2007)).) As 
such, its determination that these claims of constitutional error should have been raised 
on direct appeal is internally inconsistent with its decision on Mr. Mallory's claims that 
appellate counsel was ineffective. 
10 As will be explained in depth infra, the factual allegations supporting the motion for 
continuance, which was aimed at locating a critical witness to Mr. Mallory's alternate 
perpetrator theory, actually also demonstrate that the trial court's failure to timely rule on 
the motion to appoint a private investigator was not harmless. 
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Therefore, Mr. Mallory presented sufficient evidence to establish that these 
claims of constitutional error could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been 
raised on direct appea!. Appellate counsel exercised due diligence and determined that 
there was no viable direct appeal claim on those issues because they were not 
adequately presented below and told Mr. Mallory that post conviction was the proper 
venue in which to raise those claims. As such, the district court's determination that 
summary dismissal of these claims was appropriate because they were not raised on 
direct appeal was incorrect. 
(' 
v. Mr. Mallo r Presented Sufficient Facts To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material 
Fact Regarding His Claim That The District CoLJrt Violated His Constitutionctl 
Rights By Not Timely Ruling On His Motion For Appointment Of A Private 
Investigator 
As the Idaho Appellate courts has pointed out, the way in which a petitioner 
frames his claims for relief in post conviction can have a critical impact on the way in 
which those claims are analyzed. See, e.g., DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04; Rossignol, 
152 Idaho at 703-04. Specifically, the Court of Appeals has explained in detail how 
certain claims of constitutional error can be pursued as a claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel, a deprivation of a constitutional right, or both. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 
706. "[T]his distinction is significant because [the way in which the issue is framed] 
determines which party bears the burden of persuasion on appeal to show whether the 
alleged deprivation was prejudicial or harmless." Id. at 703. 
If viewed as a question of effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to 
Strickland[11 ], the burden rests with the defendant to both identify the acts 
or conduct alleged to have been deficient and to show how such 
deficiency was prejudicial to the defense. However, if the [claim] is 
11 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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considered in the context of deprivation of a funrlamental constitutional 
right, then pursuant to Chapman[1 2], the defendant has the burden to show 
he or she was deprived of the [constitutional right], and the state must 
then convince the reviewing couri beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction--that it was 
harmless error. 
Id. at 704. 
In this case, Mr. Mallory clearly alleged the failure to timely appoint a private 
investigator as a violation of his constitutional rights. (R., p.118.) Therefore, in order to 
survive summary dismissal, he needed only allege facts sufficient to establish a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether his constitutionnl rights were violated. See 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004 (discussing the standard for summary 
disposition). At thot point, the State then would bear the burden of proving that violation 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704; see also 
DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04 (holding that the district court erred by reviewing a claim 
of constitutional error under the ineffective assistance of counsel standards, pointing out 
that "[b]ecause DeRushe alleged admissible facts showing that counsel denied him the 
right to testify in his own behalf, we vacate the dismissal of this claim"). 
In regard to Mr. Mallory's specific claim of error - that the district court violated 
his constitutional rights by not timely ruling on his motion for appointment of a private 
investigator - there can be a cognizable constitutional right to a private investigator 
depending on the facts of a particular case. Idaho Code § 19-852( 1 )(b) provides, as 
relevant to Mr. Mallory's claim: "An indigent person who is ... under formal charge of 
having committed ... a serious crime, is entitled ... [t]o be provided with the necessary 
services and facilities of representation, including investigation and other 
12 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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preparation." (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court, in reviewing that statute, 
has explained: 
"Included within the scope of I.C. s ·J 9-852(a)[1 3] are the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment requirements of due process and equal protection as they 
apply to indigent defendants .... [T]he United States Supreme Court 
made it clear that "state( s) must, as a matter of equal protection, provide 
indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, 
when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners." It is equally 
evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic tools of an 
adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right to 
a fair trial. However, what constitutes the basic tools or necessary 
services of an adequate defense has not been clearly defined and may 
vary from case to case. Consequently, in order to determine under I.C. s 
19-852(a) whether the requested services in the present case were 
necessary in order to provide the defendant with an adequate defense, we 
must review the requests individually. 
State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 394 (1982) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 
227 (1971 )) (other internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has subsequently explained that "access to the basic 
tools of an adequate defense" includes '"access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense."' State v. Abdullah, P.3d , 2015 WL 856787, 
- -
p.16 (March 2, 2015) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)14). Therefore, 
13 Idaho Code§ 19-852 was amended in 2013, and as part of that amendment, the 
subsections were renumbered. See 2013 Idaho Laws Ch. 220. The provision relevant 
to Mr. Mallory's claim - I.C. § 19-852(1 )(b) - was originally codified as I.C. § 19-
852(a)(2), and therefore, the language in Olin applies to Mr. Mallory's claim. 
14 Ake was issued three years after Olin. Both opinions address the standards for 
providing expert assistance to an indigent defendant under federal due process and 
equal protection standards. The United States Constitution sets the constitutional floor 
for minimal protections afforded to citizens, not the ceiling. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 
899, 904 (1997). While states may rely on their own constitutions to provide the same 
or greater protections to their citizens than is afforded under the federal constitution, 
they cannot provide less protection. Id.; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2000). 
Thus, to the extent that there is any conflict in the standards discussed in Ake and Olin, 
Ake controls the analysis. Cf. Abdullah, 2015 WL 856787, p.17 (noting that "[t]here is 
little or no substantive difference between the Ake standards and this Court's standards 
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if an indigent prisoner needs the assistance of a private investigator to qather 
information relevant to a valid theory of defense that he is trying to prepare and he is 
denied access to such a private investigator, his fundamental constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection have been violated. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; Abdullah, 
2015 WL 856787, p.16; Olin, 103 Idaho at 394. 
Mr. Mallory alleged sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue regarding 
whether his constitutional rights were violated in this way. The affidavit of trial counsel 
in support of the motion for the private investigator explained the reason for the request: 
The defense in this case is in need of the services of a private 
investigator. In addition to witnesses to be interviewed there are also 
potentially items of physical evidence to be examined and factual details 
to be investigated. 
Affiant is not a trained homicide investigator, nor has Affiant ever 
worked as a peace officer. It is Affiant's belief that in order to conduct a 
proper investigation the services of a private investigator with training in 
homicide investigations are necessary. 
(See, e.g., R., p.62.) Mr. Mallory also alleged that one of the theories of defense he 
was pursuing was a theory that an alternate perpetrator actually committed the crime. 
(See, e.g., R., p.113 (claim "b").) To that point, he alleged that one of the key witnesses 
to that defense was Wes Hardy, that Mr. Hardy had left Idaho sometime after the crime 
was committed, and that Mr. Hardy was unable to be located before trial. (See, e.g., 
R., pp.23, 119.) Finally, he alleged that the inability to locate and talk to Mr. Hardy 
devastated his ability to present his theory of defense. (See, e.g., R., pp.114-15 (claims 
"i" and "k"); R., p.159 (Mr. Mallory alleging facts in his affidavit demonstrating trial 
counsel's inability to gather information from Mr. Hardy).) 
in Olin, ... [but i]n an abundance of caution, however, we will apply the Ake factors 
here.") 
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Therefore, Mr. Mallory presented sufficient facts to establish, at least, a genuine 
issue of material fact that the trial court's failure to timely rule on his motion for 
appointment of a private investigator denied him access to the raw materials integral 
to the building of an effective defense. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; Abdullah, 2015 WL 
856787, p.16. As a resu!t, summary dismissal of that c!aim was inappropriate on its 
merits. 
Thus, for any of the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the order 
summarily dismissing Mr. Mallory's claims of constitutional error, particularly, his claim 
that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection 
by not timely ruling on his motion for appointment of a private investigator. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To "Fully Litigate" A Challenge To Evidence And 
Testimony Regarding The Nature Of The Scratch Marks On His Person 
In regard to the scratch mark claim, Mr. Mallory alleged that trial counsel was 
ineffective for "not fully litigating exculpatory evidence displaying petitioner's body 
without any scratch marks at the beginning of the recorded interrogation [State's Exhibit 
15] which would have contradicted the state's theory that petitioner had mark's [sic] on 
his body before the interview that were a result of a struggle with the victim." (R., p.116 
(claim "o").) The district court summarily dismissed that claim because "the Petitioner 
fails to provide evidence from the record that supports his claim that the State asserted 
these scratch marks were received as a result of a struggle with the victim in this case." 
(R., p.183.) It also determined that Mr. Mallory had not "set forth facts which would 
establish that but for this evidence, the outcome of the case would have been different." 
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(R., p.183.) The district court's analysis of both prongs of the Strickiand ;-malysis is 
erroneous. 
As to the first prong, Mr. Mallory did present sufficient evidence to show a 
genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's performance was deficient. Notably, 
the district court's determination that Mr. Mallory d!d not support his claims with 
evidence specifically "from the record" (R., p.116 (emphasis added) - is improper. A 
petitioner can establish a genuine issue of material fact based on just an affidavit 
asserting information within the affiant-petitioner's personal knowledge. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2008) ("Baldwin presents his own affidavit 
describing his version of the interaction on January 9. Bald1.,vin's affidavit sets forth facts 
that would be admissible at trial. Thus, because Baldwin's Petition and Affidavit present 
facts that would entitle Baldwin to relief, if he were able to prove them at a hearing, the 
district court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition."); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 
588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing the same principle). 
In his affidavit filed with his amended petition for relief, Mr. Mallory alleged, 
"I pointed out to trial co-counsel ... that the scratch marks that the prosecution 
alleged occurred during the commission of the alleged crime were not present at 
the earlier points in the video [of the interrogation] .... " (R., p.160 (emphasis added).) 
That was a fact within Mr. Mallroy's personal knowledge: "I pointed out to trial co-
counsel .... " (R., p.160.) Therefore, it is a fact upon which relief could be based, and 
as such, was, by itself, sufficient evidence for the claim to survive summary dismissal. 
Compare Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155. 
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Furthermore, the State did not contradict that factual assertion. 15 (See generally 
R.) At the summary dismissal phase of proceedings, uncontradicted factual assertions 
are supposed to be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, which 
means the district court is supposed to consider those uncontested factual allegations 
as if they were true. See Baldwin, ·145 Idaho at 155 (demonstrating how this rule is 
applied to a particular factual scenario). 
If true, the factual allegation that the scratches did not occur until after the 
alleged victim had died would establish that trial counsel performed unreasonably for 
not challenging Officer Ward's opinion testimony about the nature of the scratch marks 
either through a motion to suppress or by impeaching his testimony at trial. Thus, given 
the allegations in Mr. Mallory's Llffidavit, Mr. Mallory presented sufficient facts to 
establish a genuine issue of rnatmial fact on the first prong of the Strickland analysis on 
this claim 
As to the second prong of the Strickland analysis, the district court required 
Mr. Mallory to meet an inappropriately high-burden. To show prejudice under 
15 That factual assertion is actually supported by the record. Officer Ward testified at 
Mr. Mallory's trial about the nature of the scratch marks he observed on Mr. Mallory's 
body: "Typically, on scratches or those types of injuries are [sic] what are called 
resistive -- resistive injuries. Somebody trying to get away, they're clawing, those types 
of things .... Also, on Mr. Mallory, there were scratch marks and abrasions on his back 
that were consistent with maybe a domestic violence-type situation." (Supp. Tr., p.631, 
23 - p.632, L.20.) The prosecutor also argued to the jury during closing argument that 
the scratch marks indicated that Mr. Mallory was the guilty party. (Supp. Tr., p.1277, 
Ls.16-22.) However, while these excerpts from the trial transcript do prove Mr. Mallory's 
assertion was accurate, the district court did not take judicial notice of the underlying 
case file until after the summary dismissal decision was made. (See R., p.197 n.1 (the 
district court taking judicial notice of the underlying case after the evidentiary hearing).) 
As such, Mr. Mallory recognizes that these excerpts were not part of the evidence the 
district court was considering at the summary dismissal phase. 
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Strickland, he only needed to present facts demonstrating "a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (1984) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the district court's requirement that Mr. Mallory show that "the outcome of the 
case would have been different" had the scratch mark evidence not been presented 
(R., p.183 (emphasis added) - was erroneous. 
Under the correct prejudice standard, when the alleged error is trial counsel's 
failure to litigate an issue (such as by filing a motion), the probability of success of the 
motion is highly relevant to the Strickland analysis. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 562 (2008); Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898, 904 (Ct. App. 2012); compare 
Hernandez v State, ·132 Idaho 352, 358 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that, where counsel 
failed to timely file a motion that would have been successful, the failure to make that 
challenge to the State's evidence prejudiced the petitioner). As discussed supra, the 
challenge to the scratch mark evidence had merit because, had counsel presented the 
evidence showing the scratch marks did not exist until after the alleged victim had died, 
it is highly likely that Officer Ward's testimony about the scratches being caused by the 
victim would have been suppressed as not based in fact. 
That testimony was an important part of the State's case, since the State's case 
was entirely circumstantial (there was no direct witness to the alleged criminal act). 
Mr. Mallory was arguing an alternate perpetrator theory of defense, which means he 
was arguing he was not the person who committed the alleged criminal act. (See, e.g., 
R., p.113 (claim "b").) Officer Ward's testimony that the scratches were caused by the 
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victim during a struggle directly contradicts that theory, and would, if believed, put 
Mr. Mallory not only at the scene, but would show that he was the perpetrator. Thus, 
without that evidence, there is definitely a reasonable possibility that at least one of the 
jurors would have harbored a reasonable doubt about Mr. Mallory's guilt. As such, 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different without 
Officer Ward's testimony about the scratch marks. Certainly, if Mr. Mallory's allegation 
is presumed to be true, it undermines confidence in the verdict. Thus, Mr. Mallory 
alleged sufficient facts to establish, at least, a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
prejudice on this claim. 
Since Mr. Mallory had alleged sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact on both prongs of the Strickland test on the scratch mark claim, this Court 
should reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing that claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mallory respectfully requests that this Court reverse the orders denying and 
summarily dismissing his claims for post conviction relief and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2015. 
d/_/~~L-
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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